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California Code of Civil Procedure
Sections 337.1 and 337.15: Defective
Construction Defect Statutes
Michael F. Boyle* and
Leslie M. Hastings**
I. INTRODUCTION
When a California practitioner considers a construction defect
lawsuit "priority one" is determining whether the lawsuit was filed
within the applicable the statute of limitations. In all construction
cases there may be several possible limitation periods. If a plaintiff
pleads negligence, nuisance, or strict liability, the lawsuit must be
filed within three years of discovery.' Breach of implied or express
warranty claims must be filed within either two or four years re-
spectively.2 When suing on these theories, the lawsuit obviously must
be brought within the time period set by the applicable statute of
limitations. However, in California, two other less obvious limitation
periods also apply.
* Partner, Higgs, Fletcher & Mack, San Diego, California; J.D., University of Califor-
nia, Hastings College of Law, 1975; B.A., San Diego State University, 1972. Mr. Boyle
practices in construction litigation at Higgs, Fletcher & Mack.
** J.D., California Western School of Law, 1988; B.A., Oakland University, 1980; B.S.
Oakland University, 1980.
1. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 338(b) (West 1982); Liptak v. Diane Apartments, Inc., 109
Cal. App. 3d 762, 167 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1980).
2. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 337(1) (West 1987) (governing actions on express
warranties or breach of implied warranty for work or materials furnished under a written
contract); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 21 Cal. 3d 624, 581
P.2d 197, 147 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1978). See also CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 339 (governing actions
on implied warranties); Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack, 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 847, 12 Cal. Rptr.
257 (1961).
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Where the lawsuit alleges construction defects, the time limitation
on filing a lawsuit is also governed by two special construction
statutes. California Code of Civil Procedure3 section 337.1 sets a
four-year limit on the right to commence an action based on patent,
or readily discoverable defects. 4 Section 337.15, on the other hand,
imposes a ten-year limitation on the right to commence an action
based on latent, or hidden defects.5 These statutes set two absolute
3. Unless otherwise noted all further references to code sections shall be to the California
Code of Civil Procedure and shall be designated merely as "section."
4. CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 337.1 (West 1982) states in its entirety:
Four years; actions for damages from persons performing or furnishing design,
specifications, surveying, planning, supervision or observation of construction or
construction of improvement to realty
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no action shall be brought to
recover damages from any person performing or furnishing the design, specifications,
surveying, planning, supervision or observation of construction or construction of
an improvement to real property more than four years after the substantial completion
of such improvement for any of the following:
(1) Any patent deficiency in the design, specifications, surveying, planning, super-
vision or observation of construction or construction of an improvement to, or
survey of, real property;
(2) Injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such patent deficiency;
or
(3) Injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such patent
deficiency.
(b) If, by reason of such patent deficiency, an injury to property or the person
or an injury causing wrongful death occurs during the fourth year after such
substantial completion, an action in tort to recover damages for such an injury or
wrongful death may be brought within one year after the date on which such injury
occurred, irrespective of the date of death, but in no event may such an action be
brought more than five years after the substantial completion or construction of
such improvement.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period prescribed
by the laws of this state for the bringing of any action.
(d) The limitation prescribed by this section shall not be asserted by way of
defense by any person in actual possession or the control, as owner, tenant or
otherwise, of such an improvement at the time any deficiency in such an improvement
constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or death for which it is proposed to
bring an action.
(e) As used in this section, "patent deficiency" means a deficiency which is
apparent by reasonable inspection.
(f) Subdivisions (a) and (b) shall not apply to any owner-occupied single-unit
residence.
(Added by Stats. 1967, 1326, sec. I, at 3157).
5. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CoDE § 337.15 (West 1982) states in its entirety:
Ten years; developer, contractor, architect, etc., of real property; latent deficiency
in design, supervision, etc.; injury to property.
(a) No action may be brought to recover damages from any person, or the surety
of a person, who develops real property or performs or furnishes the design,
specifications, surveying, planning, supervision, testing, or observation of construc-
tion or construction of an improvement to real property more than 10 years after
the substantial completion of the development or improvement for any of the
following:
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time limits on the right to initiate construction defect lawsuits against
developers, contractors or design professionals, 6 regardless of whether
or not a cause of action has accrued. 7
In ordinary statutes of limitations, "accrual" of a cause of action
is the trigger that sets the statutory clock ticking.8 However, in
California's special construction defect statutes, the statutory clock
begins to tick regardless of whether a plaintiff has discovered a cause
of action exists. Sections 337.1 and 337.15 may run to completion
even if no actionable damage has been discovered in the meanwhile.
(1) Any latent deficiency in the design, specification, surveying, planning, super-
vision, or observation of construction or construction of an improvement to, or
survey of, real property.
(2) Injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such latent deficiency.
(b) As used in this section, "latent deficiency" means a deficiency which is not
apparent by reasonable inspection.
(c) As used in this section, "action" includes an action for indemnity brought
against a person arising out of that person's performance or furnishing of services
or materials referred to in this section, except that a cross-complaint for indemnity
may be filed pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 428.10 in an action which has
been brought within the time period set forth in subdivision (a) of this section.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period prescribed
by the laws of this state for bringing any action.
(e) The limitation prescribed by this section shall not be asserted by way of defense
by any person in actual possession or the control, as owner, tenant or otherwise, of
such an improvement, at the time any deficiency in the improvement constitutes the
proximate cause for which it is proposed to bring an action.
(f) This section shall not apply to actions based on willful misconduct or fraudulent
concealment.
(g) The 10-year period specified in subdivision (a) shall commence upon substantial
completion of the improvement, but not later than the date of one of the following,
whichever first occurs:
(1) The date of final inspection by the applicable public agency.
(2) The date of recordation of a valid notice of completion.
(3) The date of use or occupation of the improvement.
(4) One year after termination or cessation of work on the improvement.
The date of substantial completion shall relate specifically to the performance or
furnishing design, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision, testing, observa-
tion of construction or construction services by each profession or trade rendering
services to the improvement.
(Added by Stats. 1971, 1569, sec. 1, at 3149. Amended by Stats. 1979, c. 373,
p. 1265, § 49; Stats. 1979, c. 571, p. 1797, § 1; Stats. 1980, c. 676, § 63; Stats.
1981, c. 88, § 1.).
6. These terms include architects, engineers, surveyors, planners, construction supervisors,
construction observers and construction testers. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.1(a) (West
1982); CAL. CxV. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (a) (vest 1982).
7. These two statutes set absolute time limits of four and ten years on the plaintiff's
ability to recover whether or not he has suffered any damage. See infra note 8 for the
definition of accrual.
8. Accrual means vested. A cause of action accrues when a suit may be maintained
thereon. A cause of action "accrues" on the date that the damage is sustained and not the
date when causes are set in motion which ultimately produce injury. The point in time when
a statute accrues is important for the purposes of the running of statutes of limitations. BLACKs
LAW DiCTiONARY 19 (5th ed. 1979); see also infra note 22.
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These statutes automatically begin to run when an improvement is
"substantially completed" 9 and continue to run until four years and
ten years, respectively, have passed. Once these statutes have run,
they forever bar a plaintiff's right to sue the contractor, developer,
or design professional.
Since California's two statutes constitute absolute bars to legal
action, they are actually "statutes of repose," rather than ordinary
statutes of limitations. 0 California's construction statutes and similar
statutes from other jurisdictions have been the subjects of much
legislative scrutiny and appellate interpretation." Decisions interpret-
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West 1982) (defining "substantial completion" as
being no later than the following, whichever first occurs: (1) The date of final inspection by
the applicable public agency; (2) the date of recordation of a valid notice of completion; (3)
the date of use or occupation of the improvement; or (4) one year after termination or
cessation of work on the improvement). There is no specific definition of "substantial
completion" in section 337.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Id § 337.1 (West
1982).
10. "A product liability statute of ultimate repose that starts out, 'In no event' shall any
action be commenced more than [the specified number of years], cannot be extended because
of unfairness to the plaintiff. It indicates plainly that the limitation is to be effective regardless
of circumstances." S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE, & A. GANS, THE A sERicAN LAW OF TORTS, 971
(1983) [hereinafter TnE AmERncAN LAW OF ToRTs]. The drafting of these statutes of repose in
product liability is nearly identical to that of California's construction defect statutes. The
California statutes state that 'No action may be brought to recover damages ... more than
four (or ten) years after the substantial completion.' CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §§ 337.1, 337.15
(West 1982). In fact, statutes providing a cut-off date of ultimate repose for persons designing,
making, etc., improvements to real property are not regular statutes of limitations. They do
not 'bar' a remedy in the sense of providing an injured person a certain time to instigate
suit after the 'accrual' of a 'cause of action.' The statute prevents what might otherwise be a
cause of action from ever arising .. . .The statute is a grant of immunity." THE AMERICAN
LAW OF TORTS, at 998; J. ACRET, CoNsTRucnoN LITIGATION HANDBOOK 407, 408 (McGraw-
Hill 1986). Many states enacted statutes of repose in the late 1960's to protect architects,
engineers, builders, contractors, subcontractors, and designers of improvements to real property.
Rather than limiting the time in which a plaintiff may enforce a cause of action, statutes of
repose, after a lapse of years, prevent the cause of action from ever arising. Statutes of
limitations only extinguish the right to pursue an accrued cause of action after a prescribed
time.
11. See Salinero v. Pon, 124 Cal. App. 3d 120, 128, 177 Cal. Rptr. 204, 208 (1981)
(California courts have found legitimate purpose in construction defect statutes); Wagner v.
State of California, 86 Cal. App. 3d 922, 929, 150 Cal. Rptr. 489, 493 (1978) (section 337.1
challenged on equal protection grounds and found to be constitutional because the statute
touched neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right and was thus, not subject to strict
scrutiny. The statute bore a rational relationship to the legitimate state purpose of promoting
construction.); Eden v. Van Tine, 83 Cal. App. 3d 879, 885-86, 148 Cal. Rptr. 215, 219 (1978)
(section 337.15 challenged as constitutionally void for vagueness-court held that language was
clear-statutes must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly appears). Statutes of
repose from other jurisdictions have been similarly scutinized. The majority have withstood
the constitutionality test. Some have failed. See ACRET, CONSTRUCTION LITIOATION HANDBOOK
408-9 (1986); Volk, Statutes of Repose for Improvements to Real Property: Equal Protection
Considerations, 22 Am. Bus. L.J. 343 (1984); Knapp & Lee, Application of Special Statutes
of Limitations Concerning Design and Construction, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351 (1979); Comment,
Oklahoma's Statute of Repose Limiting the Liability of Architects and Engineers for Negligence:
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ing sections 337.1 and 337.15 reflect obvious confusion over their
character. California courts have labeled them as ordinary statutes
of limitations, but applied them as both statutes of limitations and
statutes of repose. 12 Lack of a true understanding of the nature and
purpose of these statutes has ultimately resulted in their misapplica-
tion. 3
To further complicate matters, California's construction statutes
differ from construction statutes in most other jurisdictions.1 4 Cali-
fornia is one of a minority of states having separate statutes of
repose for "latent" versus "patent" construction defects. 5 Sections
337.1 and 337.15 were not drafted to coordinate with each other.
While related, these two statutes are not mirror image companions
working in harmony and accord.' 6 Rather, they are separate statutes,
enacted at different times. This temporal theoretical separation fur-
ther complicates an unsettled and complex area of the law.
California's "defective" construction defect statutes demand clar-
ification and proper application. In part II, this article addresses the
difference between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose.17
Part III focuses on the legislative history of sections 337.1 and 337.15
as well as appellate interpretations of these sections.' 8 Part IV com-
pares California's construction defect statutes with those in other
jurisdictions.' 9 Part V analyzes drafting differences between Califor-
A Potential Nightmare, 22 TULSA L.J. 85 (1986); Comment, Statutes of Limitations and
Repose, the Decline and Rise of Statutes of Repose-Witherspoon v. Sides Construction Co.,
19 CREIGHTON L. REv. 509 (1986) [hereinafter Statutes of Limitations and Repose]; Comment,
Due Process Challenges to Statutes of Repose, 40 Sw. L.J. 997 (1986); Comment, The
Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38 VA. D. L. REv. 627 (1985);
Comment, People Who Live in Glass Houses Should Not Build in Vermont: The Need for A
Statute of Limitations for Architects, 9 VT. L. Rav. 101 (1984); Note, Daugaard v. Baltic
Cooperative Building Supply Association: Statutes of Limitation Held Unconstitutional, 30
S.D.L. REv. 157 (1984); Note, Limitation of Actions: The Effect of Lamb v. Wedgewood
South Corp. on Future Cases Determining the Constitutionality of G.S. 1-50(6), 19 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1049 (1983); Note, Actions Arising Out of Improvements to Real Property:
Special Statutes of Limitations, 57 N.D.L. REv. 43 (1980); Limitations of Action - Architects
and Builders, 370 FIC QUAmERY 42 (Fall 1978) [hereinafter Builders]; Comment, Limitation
of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders - Blueprints for Non-Action, 18 CATm. U. L.
REv. 361 (1969); Comment, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HAgv. L.
REv. 1177 (1950) [hereinafter Developments].
12. See infra notes 70-140 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 39-69 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 141-159 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 144-155 and accompanying text.
16. The five drafting differences between sections 337.1 and 33.15 are addressed in detail
supra at notes 160-166 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 39-140 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 141-159 and accompanying text.
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nia's two statutes and examines the effects of these differences. 20
Finally, part VI proposes a revised model incorporating both sta-
tutes .21
II. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS VERSUS STATUTES OF REPOSE
Traditionally, the terms statute of limitations and statute of repose,
were considered to embody the same idea. 2 However, as the doctrine
of privity disintegrated and statutes of limitations evolved, a distin-
guishing line between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose
emerged.Y Sections 337.1 and 337.15 are codified in Title Two of
20. See infra notes 160-166 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 167-168 and accompanying text.
22. "A statute prescribing limitations to the right of action on certain described causes
of action; that is, declaring that no suit shall be maintained in such causes of action unless
brought within a specified period after the right accrued. Statutes of limitations are statutes
of repose." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 1979). Historically, in America, "statutes
of limitations were considered to operate as statutes of repose, and were labeled as such by
judges." See Comment, Statutes of Limitations and Repose, supra note 11, at 512. Early
American statutes of limitations adopted the accrual concept from the English Limitations
Act. Id. However, courts began to extend the statutory period, waiting until the plaintiff had
actually suffered some harm. Id. The most favored method of accrual became the "discovery
rule" method, in which the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff is injured. Id.
at 516. As history progressed the accrual doctrine in tort moved slowly from using the act on
which the asserted negligence was premised to using the date of actual injury to start the
statute running. Id. See also id. at 522 (brief summary of the evolution of statutes of repose).
From these historical developments, current construction statutes of repose dating from
completion of an improvement became a full-circle response to what eventually became ever-
widening liability under the expansion of the accrual doctrine. Id. Statutes of repose provide
substantive repose for the defendant. Id.
23'. See Volk, Statutes of Repose for Improvements to Real Property: Equal Protection
Considerations, 22 AI. Bus. L.J. 343, 352 (1984) [hereinafter Repose for Improvements]
("Statutes of limitation fix a time within which an injured person must institute an action
seeking redress, as measured from the moment the cause of action accrues. A statute of
repose, however, limits the time within which an action may be brought and is not related to
the accrual of any cause of action."); Comment, Due Process Challenges to Statutes of Repose,
40 Sw. L.J. 997, 1002 (1986) ("Strictly speaking, 'statute of repose' is a generic term of which
a statute of limitation is but a variety .... As commonly used, however, statute of repose
denotes a distinct type of statute imposing a time bar different in purpose and implementation
from a statute of limitation."); Comment, Oklahoma's Statute of Repose Limiting the Liability
of Architects and Engineers for Negligence: A Potential Nightmare, 22 TULSA L.J. 85, 90-91
(1986) ("True statutes of limitation are procedural mechanisms .... In contrast, [construction
statutes of repose] bar the right of action before any injury occurs."); Comment, The
Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38 VAND. L. REv. 627, 629 (1985)
("[Ilmportant differences exist between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. Statutes
of limitations limit the time in which a plaintiff may bring suit after the cause of action
accrues, whereas statutes of repose potentially bar the plaintiff's suit before the cause of action
arises." (emphasis in original); Comment, People Who Live in Glass Houses Should Not Build
in Vermont: The Need for a Statute of Limitations for Architects, 9 VT. L. REv. 101, 114
(1984) ("A special statute of limitations which accrues upon completion of construction is a
'statute of repose,' since it can potentially bar suits before the cause of action arises.").
240
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the California Code of Civil Procedure along with other statutes of
limitations. 24 However, both statutes are actually statutes of repose.2 5
A. The Difference Between Statutes of Limitations and Statutes
of Repose
A statute of limitations is considered a procedural device because
it extinguishes the plaintiff's remedy but not his or her underlying
right to sue. 26 Two theories are employed to determine when a regular
statute of limitations begins to run. Under the older "event rule," a
statute of limitations begins to run when the event that ultimately
causes the damage occurs even if the plaintiff is ignorant of his cause
of action. 27 Under the newer "discovery rule," a statute of limitations
begins to run when the damage upon which the claim is based occurs
and the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered their cause of
action.2
In contrast, a statute of repose is considered substantive because
it actually limits the right to pursue a cause of action.29 Statutes of
repose may circumscribe the plaintiff's fundamental right to sue by
24. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 312-565 (West 1982) ("Time of Commencing Civil Actions").
25. See ACRET, supra note 11 at 407-408. "These statutes, although they are formulated
in the language of statutes of limitations, are truly quite different. Rather than limiting the
time within which a plaintiff may sue to enforce a cause of action, statutes of repose, after a
lapse of years, prevent the cause of action from ever arising .... [Tihey dissolve all grounds
of liability ... solely by lapse of time." Id. at 408 (emphasis in original).
26. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 21 Cal. 3d 624,
644-49, 581 P.2d 197, 208-210, 147 Cal. Rptr. 486, 497-503 (1978) (Clark, J., dissenting).
Compare Comment, Limitations of Actions: The Effect of Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp.
on Future Cases Determining the Constitutionality of G.S. 1-50(6), 19 WAKE FOREST L. Rv.
1049, 1050 (1983) [hereinafter Limitations of Actions] (statute of limitation procedural);
Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders-Blueprints for Non-
Action, 18 CATH U.L. Rv. 361, 372 (1969) (statute of limitations procedural) with Comment,
Statute of Limitations and Repose, supra note 11, at 521 ("statutes of repose are considered
substantive because they either destroy a right to sue before it exists, or cut off such a right
to sue.").
27. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 165-67 (5th ed. 1984); Lattin v. Gillette, 95
C. 317, 319, 30 P. 546 (1892).
28. Id. at 166-7; Statutes of Limitations and Repose, supra note 11, at 515; Allred v.
Bekins Wide World Van Services, 45 Cal. App. 3d 984, 990, 120 Cal. Rptr. 312, 315 (1975).
29. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 30 Cal. 2d 388, 394-95,
182 P.2d 159, 162 (1947) (statute is substantive in effect when it "imposes a new or additional
liability and substantially affects existing rights and obligations"). See also Statutes of Limi-
tations and Repose, supra note 11, at 521, 534; Repose for Improvements, supra note 23, at
352; Limitations of Actions, supra note 26, at 1050 - 1052, 1063; Note, Actions Arising Out
of Improvements to Real Property: Special Statutes of Limitations, 57 N.D.L. REv. 43 (1980)
(statutes of Limitations similar to California's sections 337.1 and 337.15 are labeled as "special"
statutes of limitations throughout); Builders, supra note 11, at 51.
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running to completion during a time period before the occurrence of
the plaintiff's injuries.30 Thus, statutes of repose may function to
prevent judicially recognizable claims, while regular statutes of lim-
itation preserve claims for a stated period of time.3
Construction defect statutes of repose begin to run from the date
of substantial completion of an improvement (the event). However,
once knowledge of a defect or the damage caused by a defect occurs
(the discovery), a regular statute of limitations begins to limit the
time in which to file a construction lawsuit. The shorter of the two
remaining time periods will determine the amount of time in which
a lawsuit may be filed. 32 For a plaintiff, the problem occurs when
"substantial completion" starts running the period of repose without
the plaintiff having been damaged then, subsequent to the statutes'
expiration, the plaintiff is damaged, yet has no legal recourse. 33
B. The Necessity of Statutes of Repose
Although seemingly harsh, there is a widespread need for statutes
of repose in the construction industry. The need arises from a
combination of events unique to that industry. First, products liability
(and its subsequent application to construction improvements) has
undergone progressive expansion since the landmark case of Mac-
Pherson v. Buick34 abolished the need for privity and extended
liability horizontally through the chain of production. Second, sta-
tutes of limitations increasingly have been measured from the date
of the plaintiff's injury rather than the event causing the injury.35 In
the construction industry, the lengthy useful life of the "product"
(an improvement to real property), has exposed architects, engineers,
builders and others in the construction industry to liability indefinitely
after the completion of an improvement. 36
30. Developments, supra note 11, at 1186-90; see supra notes 23, 25 & 26.
31. Compare Comment, Daugaard v. Baltic Cooperative Building Supply Association:
Statutes of Limitation Held Unconstitutional, 30 S.D.L. REv. 157, 162 (1984), with CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 338 (West 1982) (in an ordinary statute of limitations a plaintiff has three years
to file after discovering a cause of action).
32. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 21 Cal. 3d 624,
640-641, 581 P.2d 197, 206-207, 147 Cal. Rptr. 486, 495 (1978).
33. Under sections 337.1 and 337.15 a plaintiff's cause of action has a limited life span
within the boundaries of the period of repose. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 21 Cal. 3d 624, 640-42, 541 P.2d 197, 206-7, 147 Cal. Rptr. 486,
495-6 (1978) (suit must be filed within the shorter of the two time periods).
34. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
35. Repose for Improvements, supra note 23, at 350-51. See supra, note 28 and accom-
panying text.
36. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
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In response to these events, the American Institute of Architects
(A.I.A.), the National Society of Professional Engineers, the Asso-
ciated General Contractors of America, and other construction or-
ganizations have lobbied continuously since the 1960's for statutes
limiting the duration of liability for improvements to real property. 7
In California, the movement resulted in the enactment of two con-
struction statutes of repose, sections 337.1 and 337.15. Although
section 337.1 and section 337.15 were enacted in the late 1960's and
early 1970's respectively as statutes of repose, California courts have
not recognized them as substantive statutes of repose.
38
III. ENACTMENT, INTERPRETATION, AND APPLICATION OF
CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTIONS 337.1 AND 337.15
In 1967 the California legislature enacted section 337.1 and thereby
limited the time for bringing actions based on patent defects against
architects and contractors to four years from the date of substantial
completion.3 9 In 1971, the legislature enacted a similar statute, section
337.15, which provided a ten-year limitation period for actions brought
on latent defects. 40 The legislative histories of these statutes show the
intent behind their passage and highlight the decisional confusion
that has followed.
A. Legislative History
1. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 337.1: The Four-
Year Statute of Repose for Patent Defects
In 1963, Assembly Bill Number 648 (A.B. 648) was introduced
during the regular session of the California legislature. This bill
proposed a six-year construction statute of limitations, which was
37. A~m~icAN LAw OF TORTS, supra note 10, at 990. The California Council of the
American Institute of Architects continues to monitor and support California construction
statutes and attempts to further modernize the statutes. Telephone interview with David A.
Crawford, Legislative Aide, California Council of the American Institute of Architects, October
18, 1989.
38. See infra notes 70-146 and accompanying text.
39. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.1 (West 1982). See supra note 4; see infra notes 41-56
and accompanying text.
40. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West 1982). See supra note 5; see infra notes 57-69
and accompanying text.
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worded as a statute of repose. 41 One year later, an interim committee
meeting was held to discuss the pros and cons of the bill and to
create a record to be used at a full meeting of the executive com-
mittee. An attorney representing the California Council of the A.I.A.
made a presentation on behalf of that organization. 42 He opened the
meeting stating that statutes of limitations pervade our "social,
political and legal life" to provide a period of peace after the
expiration of the period of limitations .41 He testified that nothing
remained of the privity doctrine, and no particular statute existed to
limit the liability of an architect to the owner or third parties. He
proposed that the person furnishing the design of an improvement
should be allowed to be at peace after a reasonable period, while
the owner or land occupier would still be responsible to potential
plaintiffs under the regular duty rules relating to owners and occupiers
of real property.44
The California Council of the A.I.A. submitted the A.I.A. sug-
gested form of the statute to the committee. The A.I.A. believed
their statute was superior in form to A.B. 648, being more definitive,
having tighter language, and having been drafted after consultation
with many lawyers who were familiar with the design and construction
fields. 45
41. A.B. No. 648, 1963 Calif. Leg. Reg. (General) Sess. The bill read: "No action to
recover damages for any injury ... shall be brought ... more than six years .... .
42. Assembly Interim Committee on Judiciary, Transcript of Proceedings on Statute of
Limitations, October 20, 1964.
43. Id. at 2.
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id. The complete text of the model statute was as follows: Model Statute of Limitations
for Architects, Engineers and Contractors.
Section 1. No action in contract or tort to recover damages for deficiencies in design,
planning, supervision of construction or construction or for injury to property, real
or personal, or for injury to the person or for wrongful death, arising out of the
defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, shall be brought
against any person or corporation performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision of construction or construction of such improvement more than six years
after the last performance or furnishing of services or construction by such person
or corporation, and in no event more than six years after the substantial completion
of construction of such improvement; provided however, that, notwithstanding the
above, an action in tort to recover damages for any such injury to property or the
person or for any such wrongful death may be brought within one year after the
date on which such injury occurred or, in the case of wrongful death, within one
year after the date on which the injury causing such wrongful death occurred.
Section 2. Nothing in this act shall be construed as extending the period prescribed
by the laws of this State for the bringing of any action.
Section 3. The limitation prescribed by this act shall not be asserted by way of
defense by any person in actual possession or control, as owner, tenant or otherwise,
of the improvement at the time the defective or unsafe condition of such improvement
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The committee's questions revolved around the unfairness of bar-
ring recovery for latent defects that might appear after the proposed
six-year statute ran. The President of the California Council of
Architects stated that although the appearance of latent defects after
six years was possible, the council still hoped that a cut-off period
would be established. 46 The council maintained that the desperate
need for housing and the policy against allowing stale claims out-
weighed any unfairness to possible plaintiffs. 47 This early discussion
of latent defects appears to have been the initial catalyst for excluding
latent defects from the statutory bar and necessitated the enactment
of a separate latent defect statute (section 337.15) several years later.
The committee discussion noted the fundamental difference be-
tween the proposed statute and traditional statutes of limitations.
One assemblymember argued that a statute such as the one proposed
would actually remove the construction industry from the "normal
theory of why we have statutes of limitations in the first place; you
shouldn't sleep on your rights.' '48
However, the A.I.A. attorney contended that fairness and justice
required the proposed statute because of the many forces that could
intervene in the time period between completion and repose.49 Despite
these discussions which pinpointed the repose imposed by the statute,
the committee never officially recognized nor openly stated that the
proposed statute was actually a statute of repose rather than an
ordinary statute of limitations.
The committee recommended against passing the bill because it
felt that: 1) it would bar justifiable claims, 2) the proponents had
adequate legal protection, and 3) the burden imposed by the statute
constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or death for which it is proposed to
bring an action.
Assembly Interim Committee on Judiciary, Transcript of Proceedings on Statute of Limitations,
Oct. 20, 1964 at 6. The A.I.A. statute differed from the proposed bill in several ways. The
model statute limited the application of the statute to those not in actual possession or control
as the owner, tenant or otherwise, and started the statute running upon "substantial comple-
tion," but did not define this term. Neither did the standard A.I.A. statute define "substantial
completion." Since "substantial completion" had not yet been defined in California law, the
A.I.A. representative substituted in language which tied substantial completion into mechanics
lien law which had defined substantial completion. Id.
46. Id. at 10.
47. Id. at 20-21.
48. Id. at 19 (the assemblymember seemed to be cognizant of the repose nature of the
statute, having noticed that by barring a cause of action before it arose, the statute barred
the right to sue before it arose. Thus, a plaintiff would have no right to sue after a certain
time period and could not "sleep" on such right).
49. Id. at 20.
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was too great.50 One member felt that the bar imposed by the
proposed statute was so extreme in its effect that it should be
characterized as the extinction of a cause of action before it arose,
rather than a statute of limitations.51
Although A.B. 648 was defeated, Assemblymember Powers intro-
duced a similar bill only fourteen days later.52 However, this bill also
died in committee.
Two years later, Senator Combs introduced Senate Bill 309 (S.B.
309) (a bill similar to A.B. 648). S.B. 309 proposed a bar of any
action brought on a construction deficiency, including actions for
injury or wrongful death subsequently arising out of such a defi-
ciency.53 This bill was amended three times; first, to include those
who furnish specifications and surveying;54 second, to limit the sec-
tion's coverage to only patent defects;55 and finally, to disallow
coverage of owner-occupied single-unit residences 6
Two months later the bill passed the senate unanimously and then
the assembly by a forty-four to thirteen majority. It was submitted
to Governor Reagan for approval on August 17, 1967. The bill, as
finally passed, sidestepped the major stumbling block of prior at-
tempts by limiting actions brought only on patent defects. These
actions were totally barred four years after completion of the im-
provement. The issue of a period of repose for latent defects was
left for future legislation.
2. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 337.15: The Ten-
Year Statute of Repose for Latent Defects
The next significant legal development in the construction industry
occurred in 1969 when the doctrine of strict liability was extended
to the home development industry. In Kriegler v. Eichler Homes,
50. The Final Reports of the Assembly Interim Committee on Judiciary, 19 (January 11,
1965) reprinted in AssEmBLY INTErIM Coumir REPORT, Vol. 23, No. 5 (1963-1965).
51. Id. at 19. Obviously, this assemblymember recognized the difference between the proposed
statute and an ordinary statute of limitations yet failed to label the distinction. ld.
52. A.B. No. 480, California Legislature Regular Session (1965). This bill was requested by
the Associated General Contractors represented by Mr. Kim Ross. Assembly Committee on
Judiciary Bill Analysis Work Sheet (undated) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
53. S.B. No. 309, 1967 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (as amended, introduced February 8, 1967).
54. S.B. No. 309, 1967 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (as amended in Senate, March 30, 1967).
55. S.B. No. 309, 1967 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (as amended in Senate, April 28, 1967). The
concern over barring actions brought on latent defects had been a major issue with previously
defeated Assembly Bill No 648. See A.B. 648, 1963 Cal. Leg. Reg. (General) Sess.
56. S.B. No. 309, 1967 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (as amended in Senate, May 3, 1967).
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Inc. ,57 a developer was held strictly liable for a defective central
heating system installed in a home in 1951. The existing Code of
Civil Procedure sections 338 and 337.1 provided no protection from
the infinite liability exposure imposed by the application of strict
liability to the construction industry. Thus, Kriegler obliterated the
main justification for not time barring liability for latent defects,
namely that builders could rely on the protection provided by the
necessity that the plaintiff prove negligence. 8
In apparent response to Kriegler, Assemblymember Powers intro-
duced Assembly Bill number 2528 (A.B. 2528) on April 14, 1970.
This bill proposed an eight-year statute of limitations for actions
brought on latent defects. After three amendments to Powers' bill
an interim committee hearing was held 9 to determine whether a
statute of limitations could be drafted for latent defects, 60 and whether
an entirely new statute was necessary.6' However, after a brief
statement by Mr. James Acret, who was the attorney representing
the California Builders Council, the committee meeting focused in-
stead on the issues of the availability, cost, and need to carry
insurance indefinitely to assure that building professionals would be
covered if latent defects surfaced at some later date. No additional
discussion focused on problems posed by time-barring actions on
latent defects. However, a statement on the subject by Mr. Acret
was attached to the transcript as an appendix. In this statement the
patent versus latent defect limitation problem was illustrated. Mr.
Acret explained the limited effect of section 337.1. He noted that
the vast majority of construction defect cases would not be barred
by the four-year patent defect statute because "[a]lmost any problem
with a building can be considered "latent" unless it is somehow
57. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
58. Assembly Interim Committee on Judiciary, Transcript of Proceedings on Statute of
Limitations, 13-14 (October 23, 1964).
59. According to Mr. James Acret, a construction attorney from Los Angeles who spoke
for the California Builders Council and fourteen other associations who were interested in the
issue:
The problem faced by the construction industry is one that arises out of, I think, three
different factors. One is the destruction of the doctrine that the acceptance of a project
by the owner terminates the contractor's liability. The second is the fact that the
statute of limitations in construction cases does not start to run until the injury occurs,
... and the third is the sudden flourishing of the doctrine of strict liability which is
applied to real estate.
Assembly Judiciary Interim Committee Transcript of Hearing on the Application of the Doctrine
of Strict Tort Liability to Building Construction at 5 (October 23, 1970).
60. Id. at 1.
61. Id. at 4.
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clearly visible on the walls, ceiling, roof, or floor. Thus, section
337.1 is virtually meaningless. A patent deficiency would seemingly
be covered by other sections of the statute of limitations, since a
patent deficiency is one which should be known to the claimant." 62
The bill did not pass.
Six months after the interim committee hearing, Senate Bill number
905 (S.B. 905) was introduced. 63 This bill proposed a six-year statute
of limitations for latent defects but was apparently eclipsed by
Assembly Bill number 2742 (A.B. 2742), introduced three days later. 64
A.B. 2742, proposing a six-year statute of limitations for latent
defects, was drafted by the California Builders Council, based on
the model statute previously reviewed by the interim committee.65 It
was amended three times. The first amendment deleted definitions
of "improvement" and "substantial completion" and re-worded the
prohibition against applying the statute to those in possession and
control.16 The second amendment changed the statutory period from
six to ten years and deleted the provision allowing the statute to be
applied in actions for personal injury or wrongful death.67 The third
and final amendment deleted reference to injury or death from the
section describing parties who may not assert the limitation period
as a defense.68
The latent defect bill passed in November 1971 by a unanimous
senate vote and a fifty-eight to four majority in the assembly.
Although repeated references had been made in the committee hear-
ings to section 337.1, A.B. 2742 failed to indicate how the new bill
interrelated with section 337.1.
Thus, the two "special" statutes of limitations, sections 337.1 and
337.15, having been discussed, debated, and enacted more than four
years apart, became law. They were codified with other "statutes of
62. Id. at Appendix A, p. 7-8 (Mr. Acret seemed to be pointing out that a patent defect
must by definition be discoverable upon completion at which point the regular statutes of
limitations governing lawsuit within the shorter of the two time periods. Since none of the other
statutes exceed four years a patent defect lawsuit is always controlled by the other statutes).
63. S.B. No. 905, 1971 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (introduced April 12, 1971).
64. A.B. No. 2742, 1971 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess.
65. Memo from Charles Warren dated July 12, 1971, regarding A.B. No. 2742 (on file at
the Pacific Law Journal). See also Assembly Judiciary Committee, Transcript of Hearing on
Application of The Doctrine of Strict Tort Liability to Building Construction at 12, October 23,
1970.
66. A.B. No. 2742, 1971 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (as amended in Assembly July 13, 1971).
67. A.B. No. 2742, 1971 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (as amended in Assembly July 22, 1971).
68. A.B. No. 2742, 1971 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (as amended in Assembly October 22, 1971)
(effective March 4, 1972).
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limitations" for actions in tort and contract, although these statutes,
being statutes of repose, varied greatly in effect from regular statutes
of limitations. The legislature provided no express instructions re-
garding how sections 337.1 and 337.15 interrelated with the regular
limitations. Thus, a series of decisions emerged evidencing obvious
confusion over the nature of these statutes and their proper appli-
cation in different factual situations. In addition, there continued to
be a steady stream of amendments to existing section 337.15 and
regular attempts to further amend the statute.69
B. Case Law Interpreting California's Statutes of Repose
Courts interpreting section 337.15 frequently characterize both
sections 337.1 and 337.15 as ordinary, procedural statutes of limi-
tations rather than substantive statutes of repose. These statutes were
intended to provide ultimate repose for those in the construction
industry. As the true nature of the statutes have been misinterpreted,
repose has been and continues to be threatened in construction defect
cases.
In Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc. ,70 the court of appeal for
the Second District interpreted section 337.15 in a products liability
69. See A.B. No. 3715, 1981-82 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (introduced by Assemblymember Papan
to decrease the limitation period in section 337.15 from ten to five years. This bill was supported
by the Consulting Engineers Association, Association of General Contractors, Association of
General Contractors of San Diego, Nor. Cal. Engineering Contractors Ass'n, Nor. Cal. Con-
struction Contractors Association, Flasher Barracade, Underground Contractors, and CIBA. The
bill was opposed by the California Trial Lawyers Ass'n and was defeated). See also A.B. No.
1818, 1983-84 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (introduced by Assemblymember Johnson to amend section
337.15 to include a bar of actions for damages for bodily injuries or wrongful death outside the
ten-year limitation period. As amended, the bill did not reduce the time limitation from ten to
five years. The bill was defeated.); S.B. No. 1494, 1984 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (as amended in
Senate April 5, 1984) (introduced by Senator Dills to provide that actions based on strict liability,
inverse condemnation or liability without fault against developers of real property be barred three
years after substantial completion. The bill did not pass.); S.B. No. 2873, 1987-88 Cal. Leg.
Reg. Sess. (introduced by Senator Keene to decrease the time period in section 337.15 from ten
to five years, except for bodily injury or wrongful death actions); S.B. No. 1609, 1988-89 Cal.
Leg. Reg. Sess. (introduced by Senator Stirling to standardize all statutes of limitations to three
years. The bill was not heard and put over to the 1989 session.); A.B. No. 915, 1988-89 Cal.
Leg. Reg. Sess. (introduced by Assemblymember Lancaster to decrease the time limit of section
337.15 from ten to five years. The bill was not heard and put over to the second year of the
two-year session.).
70. 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1972). Balido involved an action by the
operator of a plastic molding press against a prior owner of the press, the manufacturer, and
the operator's employer for injuries sustained to the operator's hand due to the press closing on
the operator's hand during an adjustment. Id. at 637, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 892. Although Balido
involved strict products liability, the court faced the issue of time lapse and the causal connection
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case involving the effect of time lapse on causation. 7  The Balido
court noted that in the building and medical professions, the legis-
lature had provided the courts with a solution to the problem of
determining a fair limitation period in areas where the effects of
time, changed conditions, and questions of causation have been
troublesome factors affecting the fairness of a lawsuit. 72 This was
done by providing an "arbitrary, mechanical solution" in the form
of particular statutes of limitations.73 The court explained that these
statutes, although "couched as procedural limitations," have the
effect of terminating substantive liability by providing that after a
specified amount of time, no causal connection between the defect
and the injury will be legally recognized. 74 The court cited sections
340.5 and 337.15 as examples of special statutes of limitations that
terminate substantive liability after a specified time.75 The Balido
court recognized section 337.15 as a substantive limitation on the
plaintiff's ability to bring suit and dismissed the plaintiff's claim.
1. The Hartford Decision: Majority Opinion
Five years later in Regents of the University of California v.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.,76 the California Supreme
Court specifically refuted the definition of section 337.15 contained
in Balido indicating that the statute was intended to be a procedural
rather than a substantative limitation. 77 In Hartford, the owner of
an apartment complex brought an action against the architect, general
contractor, and the general's surety for damages resulting from latent
defects in construction. The apartments had been completed in 1962.
between the plaintiff's injury and the design. In this context the court noted other areas where
causality had been dealt with statutorily, i.e. the construction industry. Id. at 642, 105 Cal. Rptr.
at 896.
71. The Balido court considered the effect of the passage of time between the deficient
design of the press and the injury. In discussing this problem, the court used section 337.15 as
an example of a statute intended by the legislature to solve the problems of time and the
accompanying reliability of proof, by specifying a particular time after which a causal connection
between the defect and injury will not be recognized. Id. at 642, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
72. Id. at 642, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (Civil Procedure Code section 340.5 limits the time in which certain malpractice
actions against health care providers may be brought to three years from the date of injury.
Section 337.15 is the statute precluding actions brought on latent defects against developers,
contractors, and architects occurring more than ten years from the date of substantial completion).
76. 21 Cal. 3d 624, 581 P.2d 197, 147 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1978).
77. See supra notes 26-34.
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Latent defects were discovered at least by 1972, and the lawsuit was
filed in 1974, almost twelve years after completion. 78 The court held
that although the general contractor was protected by the statutory
bar of section 337.15, the construction surety was not protected.
In Hartford, the defendant-surety retained the right to seek reim-
bursement from the principal. The court adhered to the "established
principle that the running of a period of limitations on the principle
obligation does not exonerate the surety." ' 79 The court then had to
address the question, whether recognizing a suit against the surety
(and the surety's right to proceed against the general for reimburse-
ment) defeated the legislative purpose of section 337.15.80 In order
for the court to find that the statute of limitations did not bar the
action against (or by) the surety, the court had to find that section
337.15 was an ordinary, procedural limitation on the plaintiff's cause
of action subject to the same rules as other statutes of limitations. 81
The court viewed section 337.15 as a procedural limitation and held
therefore that it did not bar an action against the surety.
The majority justified its holding on the ground that although
section 337.15 was a total bar, nothing in the placement or language
of section 337.15 supported its interpretation as a substantive limi-
tation.82 Further, the majority relied on the codification of section
337.15 in the portion of the Code of Civil Procedure set aside for
other procedural statutes of limitations. 83
Finally, the majority stated that the legislature did not intend for
the enactment of section 337.15 to invoke the "collateral conse-
quences" that a substantive statute would invoke.84 The majority
explained that although section 337.15 might occasionally bar a
78. Hartford, 21 Cal. 3d at 629, 581 P.2d at 199, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 640, 581 P.2d at 206, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
81. Id. at 642, 581 P.2d at 207, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
82. Id. at 642, 581 P.2d at 206, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 641, 581 P.2d at 207, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 496. Collateral consequences are
interpretations applied to a statute that flow from the statute by virtue of its classification, or
type, rather than its actual drafting. Examples of collateral consequences of a statute are questions
of pleading, waiver, choice of law, and retroactivity. Limitation of a substantive right means
that a right upon which a suit could have been maintained expires. Because of its nature there
are particular effects that accompany a substantive statute. These are referred to as collateral
consequences of the statute. 3 B. Wrrcng, CAiFoRNIA PRocEDuRE 345-46 (3d ed. 1985). For
example, where a statute is substantive the plaintiff must allege facts showing that the statute
did not expire, rather than the usual situation in which the defendant raises the statute of
limitations as a defense. Williams v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 941, 949-50,
231 Cal. Rptr. 234, 239 (1986).
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plaintiff's remedy before the plaintiff discovers a latent defect, section
337.15 was no different from any other "admittedly procedural
statutes of limitation[s]" running from the date of an event rather
than discovery.85
The Hartford majority countered Balido stating that it had "mis-
characterized" section 337.15 by classifying it as a substantive limi-
tation.8 6 The majority stated that since the statute excludes owners
and tenants of the property and mentions the liability of laborers
and materialmen only in regards to indemnity actions, the cause of
action is not obliterated and thus the statute is not substantive in
nature.8 7 The majority said that actions against sureties are not
supposed to be time barred, as evidenced by the legislative intent
indicated by their omission from the statute.88 The weakness in this
argument became apparent one year later when section 337.15 was
amended by the legislature to include protection of the statutory bar
for sureties. 9
In retrospect, in Hartford, the Supreme Court of California prop-
erly applied the statute to the facts of that case, but in doing so the
court caused subsequent courts attempting to follow the opinion to
misinterpret section 337.15. The confusion was created by classifying
the statute as the same as any procedural statute that accrued upon
the occurrence of an event rather than discovery. The majority
neglected to point out that historically, those "admittedly proce-
dural" statutes of limitations that accrued upon the occurrence of
an event had actually been considered substantive in nature.
2. The Hartford Dissent
Justice Clark in his dissent maintained that allowing the surety's
right to reimbursement, in effect, constituted recognition of a suit
85. Hartford, 21 Cal. 3d at 641 n.13, 581 P.2d at 207 n.13, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 496 n.13.
86. Id. at 641-42, 581 P.2d at 207, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
87. Id. at 641-42, 581 P.2d at 207, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 497. This reasoning is erroneous. The
statute obliterates the right to sue the design professional, not just the remedy. Therefore, the
substantive nature is not mitigated by the availability of other defendants. For example, the fact
that an owner cannot assert the statute does nothing to preserve the plaintiff's cause of action
for negligent construction against the builder.
88. Id. at 642, 581 P.2d at 207, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 496. The court inferred the legislative
intent by omission of sureties from the statute. Id.
89. See 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 571, sec. 1, at 1797 (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15)
(adding the phrase "or the surety of a person" to subdivision a).
252
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against the principal after the ten-year limitation period. ° Justice
Clark further maintained that because section 337.15 is a substantive
limitation on the right to bring an action against the principal, it is
unfair to impose a duty of reimbursement on the principal. 91 The
dissent contended that section 337.15 is not an ordinary procedural
statute but rather a substantive limitation upon the contractor's duties
and the plaintiff's cause of action. 92
Justice Clark adhered to the Balido interpretation which classified
the statute as a "statute of limitations" phrased to constitute a
substantive limitation.93 He attacked the majority view that by ex-
cluding owners and tenants from protection section 337.15 was not
a substantive bar. He explained that owners and tenants are excluded
from the statute's reach because they continue to control and main-
tain improvements. 94 Since they are in control of the improvement,
it would be "absurd to provide that no action for property damage
... could be brought against them more than ten years after ...
completion of the improvement. " 95
Finally, Justice Clark criticized the majority for classifying section
337.15 as a procedural limitation on the basis that the legislature had
not expressly indicated that the "collateral consequences" to be
applied were those that attach to a substantive limitation.96 Legislative
failure to expressly specify the collateral consequences of a statute
requires that those interpreting the statute classify the statute as
procedural or substantive in order to determine the collateral con-
sequences that flow from the statute. The failure to specify collateral
consequences does not conversely determine whether the statute is
90. Hartford, 21 Cal. 3d at 644, 581 P.2d at 208-9, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98 (Clark, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Clark concurred in the majority's finding that running of a
statute on the creditor's claim against a principal does not bar action against the surety. Justice
Clark agreed with the majority that if compelled to pay, a surety could recover from his principal.
However, since the limitation on the creditor's claim was substantive, Justice Clark stated that
the duty to reimburse could not be imposed on the principal. Id. See also id. at 646 n.2, 581
P.2d at 210 n.2, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 449 n.2 (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting).
91. Id. at 645, 581 P.2d at 209, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 498 (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice Clark noted the unfairness in imposing liability on the surety since the surety is unable
to obtain reimbursement. Id.
92. Id. at 645, 581 P.2d at 209-10, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 498-99 (Clark, J., concurring and
dissenting).
93. Id. at 645, 581 P.2d at 209, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 498 (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting).
94. Id. at 646 n.l, 581 P.2d at 210 n.1, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 499 n.1 (Clark, J., concurring
and dissenting).
95. Id. (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting).
96. Id. at 646 n.2, 581 P.2d at 210 n.2, 147 Cal. Rptr. 499 at n.2 (Clark, J., concurring
and dissenting).
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procedural or substantive. 97 Thus, failure by the legislature to specify
the collateral consequences should not have been used by the majority
as determinative that the statute was intended to be a procedural
limitation. 9
3. Post Hartford Decisions
a. Hartford Followed-Section 337.15 Labeled Procedural
One month after Hartford, the use of collateral consequences to
classify section 337.15 resurfaced in the case of Eden v. Van Tine.99
Eden involved an action by home buyers against a co-owner builder
and a soil engineer for damages arising from the discovery of a failed
patio wall.100 Discovery of the failure led the plaintiffs to discover
that the land under the home was unstable causing the residence to
suffer substantial structural problems.'01 The improvement had been
substantially completed on February 5, 1963. The plaintiffs discovered
defects on December 1, 1972, and filed their complaint on May 11,
1973, subsequent to the enactment of section 337.15.02
Prior to the enactment of section 337.15, the plaintiffs would have
had three years after discovery in which to commence an action on
the defect.103 However, subsequent to the enactment of section 337.15
in 1971, the plaintiff in Eden had less than two months after discovery
of the defect in which to file a complaint before the statute ran.' °
Thus, a collateral consequence of the statute became an issue. The
97. See id. (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting).
98. Id. (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting).
99. 83 Cal. App. 3d 879, 148 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1978).
100. Id. at 882, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17 (failure had been concealed).
101. Id. at 882, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
102. See 1971 Cal. Stat. ch. 1569 sec. 1, at 2149 (enacting CAL. CODE CrV. PRoc. § 337.15).
103. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 338 (Vest 1982) (three years from date of discovery for
negligence, nuisance or strict liability).
104. In Eden, the date of substantial completion was February 5, 1963. Eden, 83 Cal. App.
3d 879, 885, 148 Cal. Rptr. 215, 218-19 (1978). The date that the plaintiff first noticed a defect
was December 1, 1972. Id. at 882, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 216. The ten-year statutory period of section
337.15 ran on February 5, 1973. Id. at 885, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 219. After investigating the defect,
the complaint was filed May 11, 1973, under section 338. Id. at 881, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
Prior to enactment of section 337.15, the plaintiff would have had until December 1, 1975 to
file (three years from notice of the defect). Id. at 888, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
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collateral consequence at issue in Eden was whether section 337.15
would be applied retroactively to bar the action. 10 5
In order to determine whether the statute could be applied retro-
actively, the court cited Hartford for the proposition that section
337.15 was a procedural statute of limitations. 106 The court held that
since section 337.15 was a procedural statute, 0 7 the collateral con-
sequence of retroactive application was proper. However, within the
facts of this case, the court held that fairness dictated that the
plaintiff be given a "reasonable" period after discovery of the defect
in which to file his complaint.' 8 Thus, the court found that the
statute could be applied retroactively based on its "procedural"
nature, but in this case the statute was not used to bar the plaintiff's
cause of action.
Two years later the retroactivity issue again prompted a finding
that section 337.15 is a procedural limitation. In Liptak v. Dianne
Apartments, Inc.,'09 an improvement was completed in 1967 and
found to be defective in 1978. Since section 337.15 had not been
enacted until 1972, the plaintiffs had more than five years to file.
The court retroactively applied section 337.15 to bar the action.
In holding that retroactive application of the statute was proper,
the court stated that "a change in the limitation period merely effects
105. Eden, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 219. The issue was whether the ten-
year bar of section 337.15 would be applied to a time period that began running before the
enactment of the statutes. See, e.g., Wagner v. State of California, 86 Cal. App. 3d 922, 928,
150 Cal. Rptr. 489, 492 (1978) (the court of appeal for the Third District stated that the
application of a newly enacted period of limitations whose operation depends upon some facts
or conditions which were in existence prior to the enactment does not mean the statute is being
retroactively applied).
106. "Section 337.15 is a procedural statute of limitations." Eden, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 886,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
107. See Rosenfield Packing Co. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 2d 120, 47 P.2d 716 (1935) ("[ilt
has been specifically held that the legislature may shorten or extend the period of the statute of
limitations, or similar time statutes relating to procedures, and that the changed time period may
be made applicable to pending proceedings .... "). Thus, the Eden court was forced to call the
statute procedural in order to utilize the language in Rosenfield. Eden, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 887,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
108. Eden, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 887, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 220. The court allowed the statute to
be applied retroactively based on its procedural nature but at the same time defeated the statutory
bar by granting the plaintiffs a reasonable time after discovery in which to file. Other jurisdictions
have held that tort statutes of limitations such as those for medical malpractice or construction
statutes of repose will not be applied retroactively unless the legislature expressly or in the
language of the statutes impliedly showed an intention that it be so applied. Tim AmERcICAN LAw
OF TORTS supra note 10, at 899 n.14.
109. 109 Cal. App. 3d 762, 167 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1980). The subject property was graded and
filled in 1967. The property shifted in 1978 causing damage to a home constructed on the
property. The complaint was filed in 1978. Id. at 767, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
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a change in procedure." 110 In a footnote, the court noted that Balido
had considered the statute substantive and Hartford had held that
interpretation in error."' No comment was made regarding the Hart-
ford characterization of the statute, or the effect that finding the
statute substantive would have on the issue of retroactivity. Liptak
followed Hartford in labeling the statute procedural for the purpose
of applying it retroactively. However, at the same time the court
defined the statute as an "absolute requirement that a suit ... be
brought... within ten years of... substantial completion.""12 Thus,
although the Liptak court identified section 337.15 as a procedural
rather than a substantive limitation, the statute was applied to bar
plaintiff's lawsuit brought more than ten years after completion.
b. Hartford Sidestepped-Section 337.15 Recognized as
Substantive
Amidst the confusion generated by the statutes themselves and the
Hartford characterization of section 337.15 as a procedural limitation,
there have been several appellate decisions that have sidestepped
Hartford and correctly recognized both the nature and effect of
section 337.15.
In Hahn v. Superior Court of Los Angeles," 3 the court stated that
section 337.15:
fixes the point at which the period of limitations begins to run at
the completion of construction and not the accrual of any cause of
action resulting therefrom. Further, since it deals with latent defects
and places a finite limit on the time in which an action can be
brought, the limitation period contained therein is not one that can
be extended by any reasonable failure to discover the defect or the
cause of action."l 4
The court acknowledged that the public policy behind section
337.15 was, "to promote construction and ... to remove the peril
of remote and distant liability which would tend to deter persons
from entering into the construction business.""'
110. Id. at 773, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 446 [footnote omitted].
111. Id. at 773 n.6, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 446 n.6.
112. Id. at 769, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
113. 108 Cal. App. 3d 587, 166 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1980).
114. Id. at 570, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
115. Id.
256
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In Barnhouse v. City of Pinole,"6 plaintiffs discovered damage to
their real property more than ten years after substantial completion.
On appeal, the plaintiffs contested the constitutionality of section
337.15 which had been used to bar the action in the trial court. The
court of appeal cited Hartford for the proposition that section 337.15
was no different than any other "admittedly procedural statutes that
run from the date of an event rather than discovery."1 7 However,
after quoting Hartford's mischaracterization of the statute, the Barn-
house court acknowledged the repose imposed by the statute, stating
that "[t]o accept appellants' argument-that they must be permitted
reasonable time from the discovery of the damage to bring their
lawsuit-would render the discussion in Regents meaningless.""'
Barnhouse evidences an understanding of the true nature of section
337.15 and a look beyond the semantics of Hartford.
In the years following Barnhouse, many cases address the distinc-
tion between latent and patent;" 9 how fraud affects sections 337.1
and 337.15;120 whether personal injury or wrongful death are included
in the bar imposed by these statutes; 2' and how the statutes affect
indemnification. 22 The issue of the substantive versus procedural
nature of the two statutes rested for a while. 23 However, the con-
116. 133 Cal. App. 3d 171, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1982).
117. Id. at 186, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 889 (quoting Regents v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 21
Cal. 3d 624, 641 n.13, 581 P.2d 197, 207 n.13, 147 Cal. Rptr. 486, 496 n.13 (1978)).
118. Id.
119. Preston v. Goldman, 42 Cal. 3d 108, 720 P.2d 476, 227 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1986) (previous
owners not liable for injury when they no longer owned property); Bingham Toyota v. Marks-
Gobel & Assocs., Inc., 178 Cal. App. 3d 786, 224 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1986) (the issue of whether a
defect was latent or patent was an issue of fact, however an appeal to the California Supreme
Court for review was denied and the opinion depublished); Mosley v. Adams, 170 Cal. App. 3d
355, 216 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1985) (latent defects); Kralow Company v. Sulley-Miller Contracting Co.,
168 Cal. App. 3d 1029, 214 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1985) (although unable to find any legislative history
regarding section 337.1, the legislature intended that section 337.1 would apply to defects that
were patent at the substantial completion of an improvement); Renown, Inc. v. Hensel Phelps
Constr. Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 413, 420, 201 Cal. Rptr. 242, 245 (1984) (the "critical distinction
between a defect which is latent and one which is patent is its susceptibility to detection." The
court opined that reasonable inspection for a defect is to be determined from the "totality of
the circumstances").
120. E.g., Felburg v. Don Wilson Builder, 142 Cal. App. 3d 383, 191 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1983)
(statute of limitations no bar in fraud case).
121. Martinez v. Traubner, 32 Cal. 3d 755, 758, 653 P.2d 1046, 1048, 187 Cal. Rptr. 251,
253 (1982) (California Supreme Court held that Civil Procedure Code section 337.15 does not
limit the time for bringing an action for personal injury or wrongful death).
122. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward, Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 256 (1985) (indemnity action).
123. Sandy v. Superior Court, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1277, 247 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1988) (under Civil
Procedure Code section 337.15, architect not held liable for defects in original construction more
than ten years before action was filed); Stoneson Development Corp. v. Superior Court of San
Mateo County, 197 Cal. App. 3d 178, 242 Cal. Rptr, 721 (1987) (ten-year limitation of Civil
Procedure Code section 337.15 applies to a cause of action based on strict product liability).
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fusion over the characterization of section 337.15 continues, and even
courts recognizing the repose imposed by section 337.15 (and 337.1)
continue to confuse others by labeling these statutes similar to "other
admittedly procedural statutes that run from the date of an event
instead of the date of discovery."' 12 4
c. Cascade Gardens-A Recent Misapplication of Section
337.15
In September 1987, the court of appeal for the Fourth District
once again relied on Hartford to mischaracterize section 337.15. In
Cascade Gardens Homeowners Association v. McKeller & Associ-
ates,l 5 a condominium project developed leaky roofs soon after the
original homeowners moved in. The developer, McKeller, promised
to correct the situation by contracting with a roofing company to
perform the necessary repairs. Those repairs took four months to
complete. 26 Approximately seven years later the roofs began to leak
again and the condominium homeowners association sued Mc-
Keller.127 Although the plaintiff filed suit more than ten years after
substantial completion, the court of appeal reversed the trial court's
decision that section 337.15 barred the action.- 8
Cascade Gardens held that during the time period while the roof
repairs were being made, the statute had been tolled. 129 The court
stated that, "[s]ince section 337.15 is an ordinary statute of limita-
tions ... it is subject to the same rules which toll other statutes of
limitations."'' 30 The court further stated that "[t]he dispositive issue
is whether the statute of limitations set forth by section 337.15 was
tolled or suspended during 'this period of repair'. Clear authority
establishes that repairs, such as those undertaken by McKeller and
Hutchinson, toll statutes of limitations as a matter of law."'
124. Hartford, 21 Cal. 3d 624, 641 n.13, 581 P.2d 197, 207 n.13, 147 Cal. Rptr. 486, 496
n.13. (Emphasis added).
125. 194 Cal. App. 3d 1252, 240 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1987).
126. Id. at 1254-55, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 114-15.
127. Id. at 1255, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
128. Id. at 1258, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1256, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 116 (citing Regents of University of California v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 21 Cal. 3d at 642, 581 P.2d at 197, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (1978)).
131. Cascade Gardens, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 1256, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 116 (citing Mack v.
Hugh Comstock Assocs., 225 Cal. App. 2d 583, 589-90, 37 Cal. Rptr. 466, 470 (1964); Aced v.
Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 585, 360 P.2d 897, 904 (1961); Southern California
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The Cascade Gardens court cited Mack v. Hugh Comstock Asso-
ciates, Inc. ,132 in which the court allowed the limitation period to be
tolled by repairs. Cascade Gardens stated that Mack allowed section
337.1 to be tolled. The Cascade Gardens court reasoned that since
sections 337.1 and 337.15 are so similar that the Mack tolling principle
should be applied to section 337.15.' 33 This analysis was an error in
research and reasoning by the Cascade Gardens court. The Mack
decision allowed tolling of section 337 subdivision 1, which is the
four-year statute of limitation on a written contract, not section
337.1134 which is the four-year statute of limitations for patent
construction defects. The California Legislature had not yet enacted
section 337.1 when Mack was decided in 1964.' 3- Section 337.1
therefore could not rationally set precedent for the tolling of section
337.15.
The court's principal rationale for tolling the statute was the
classification of section 337.15 as an ordinary statute of limitations.
Had the court recognized the statute as a substantive statute of
repose, the decision to toll the statute would have required a far
more intricate analysis of the legislative intent and the principle of
tolling.136
Commentators and case law recognize that the tolling of a statute
may vary with the circumstances and drafting of different statutes.13 7
Although there are several conditions that are generally recognized
as probable bases for tolling a statute of limitations, other states
have codified tolling provisions for greater clarity, and more probable
fulfillment of the legislative intent.' 38 Additionally, if a statute pro-
vides a period after which the defendant may have complete repose,
Enterprises v. D.N. & E. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 750, 755, 178 P.2d 785, 788 (1947)).
The court stated that Mack v. Hugh Comstock was factually similar to the case at bar as each
involved tolling an ordinary statute of limitations during repairs. Id. at 1257, 250 Cal. Rptr. at
116. The court failed to recognize the repose imposed section 337.15, an entirely different statute
than in Mack. Also, the court incorrectly stated that Mack interpreted section 337.1. At the time
of the decision in Mack, section 337.1 had not yet been enacted. The California legislature
enacted Section 337.1 in 1967; Mack was decided in 1964.
132. 225 Cal. App. 2d 583, 37 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1964).
133. Cascade Gardens, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 1257 n.4, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 116 n.4.
134. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 337(1) (West 1982). See Mack, 225 Cal. App. 2d at 589, 37
Cal. Rptr. at 470.
135. 1967 Cal. Stat. ch. 1326, sec. 1, at 3157 (enacting CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 337.1).
136. "Generalization in the area of tolling is unwarranted largely because of the difference
underlying considerations and policies entailed in the various forms of tolling." Note, Tolling
Provision of the Statute of Limitations-A Haven for the Dilatory Plaintiff, 10 SEToN HFAu 585
(1980). See also AumucAN LAW OF TORTS, supra note 10, at 910.
137. Am1UcAN LAW oF TORTS, supra note 10, at 910-11.
138. Id.
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a court may find that the assurance of repose outweighs the burden
on the plaintiff of not tolling the statute.3 9 Thus, by failing to
adequately address the tolling issue and misinterpreting prior prece-
dent, Cascade Gardens became the latest in a long line of cases
which misapply California's statutes of repose.
The legislature enacted sections 337.1 and 337.15 for the purpose,
and with the intent, of protecting those in the business of design,
construction, and related industries. 140 However, this protection con-
tinues to be eroded by decisions in which application of the statutes
fails to recognize the legislature's intent. Cascade Gardens is yet
another decision where the Hartford misinterpretation of section
337.15 as an "ordinary statute of limitations" was used to improperly
apply the statute. These statutes are neither ordinary nor regular
statutes of limitations.
Hartford has been, and continues to be, the shaky foundation
upon which courts have based their opinions regarding whether to
characterize sections 337.1 and 337.15 as procedural statutes of
limitations or substantive statutes of repose. The character of these
statutes must correctly be defined in order to assure their proper and
effective application.
Recognizing sections 337.1 and 337.15 as substantive statutes of
repose is essential to fulfilling the legislative intent behind their
enactment. Only complete understanding of these statutes will assure
that they are properly applied and that the intended collateral con-
sequences flow from their use. Proper labeling and use of these
statutes will allow purchasers of real property improvements to be
aware of the difference between these statutes and other statutes of
limitations and provide them with adequate notice that their rights
will be absolutely extinguished after a designated number of years.
Finally, proper identification of these statutes as statutes of repose
should promote a decrease in unnecessary litigation by encouraging
the granting of a motion for summary judgment when it is obvious
that one of these statutes of repose has run.
Proper classification and application of statutes of repose is un-
likely as long as they remain categorized with regular statutes of
139. Id. at 970-71. The court in Cascade Gardens should have found that protecting the
policy of repose outweighed the grant of the four month tolling period. In Cascade Gardens,
the plaintiffs allowed three years to pass between the recurrence of the defect and filing their
lawsuit. They also allowed ten years and one month to elapse between the original occurrence
of the defect and filing. Cascade Gardens, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 1254-5, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 114-
115.
140. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
1990 / Defective Construction Defect Statutes
limitations. Thus, this article recommends that California's statutes
of repose should be codified separately from the other limitations,
in a section entitled "Statutes of Repose."
However, in order to increase effectiveness and clarify legislative
intent, sections 337.1 and 337.5 demand not only reclassification, but
also redrafting and consolidation. The first step in redrafting sections
337.1 and 337.15 requires an analysis of the statutes themselves, and
a comparison to similar statutes that are now in effect nation-wide.
IV. A COMPARISON OF CAUFORNIA'S DUAL CONSTRUCTION
STATUTES OF REPOSE WITH THOSE OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Presently, forty-six states and the District of Columbia, have
enacted legislation which attempts to bar construction based lawsuits
after a designated number of years.14 1 While most of the statutes are
141. Arkansas has a five-year statute for contract actions and a four-year statute for wrongful
death actions. ARK. STAT. Am. §§ 37-237-37-238 (1985). California has a four-year statute for
patent defects that includes actions for wrongful death and a ten-year statute for latent defects
which does not mention wrongful death actions. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 337.1, 337.15 (West
1982). Colorado has a six-year statute which includes wrongful death actions. CoLo. REv. STAT.
§ 13-80-104 (1986). Connecticut has a seven-year statute that includes wrongful death actions.
CoNN. GE . STAT. ANN. § 52-584a (West 1987). Delaware has a six-year statute that bars
wrongful death actions. DEL. CODE ANr. tit. 10 § 8127 (1974). The District of Columbia has a
ten-year statute that bars wrongful death actions. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310 (1987). Florida has
a four-year limitation on actions brought on patent defects and a fifteen-year limitation on
actions brought on latent defects. Both limitation periods are included in the same statute. The
statute does not specifically mention wrongful death actions. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (West
1982). Georgia has an eight-year statute that includes wrongful death actions. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-3-51 (1982). Hawaii has a ten-year statute that does not specifically mention wrongful death.
HAw. Ray. STAT. § 657-8 (1985). Idaho has a six-year statute that does not specifically mention
wrongful death but impliedly mentions it saying, "[t]he times fixed by these sections shall not
be asserted by way of defense by any person in actual possession or control ... of an improvement
at the time any deficiency in such an improvement constitutes that proximate cause of an injury
or death for which it is proposed to bring an action." IDAHO CODE § 5-241 (1979). Illinois has
a twelve-year statute that does not specifically mention wrongful death actions. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110, para. 13- 214 (Smith Hurd 1984). Indiana has a ten-year statute that includes wrongful
death actions. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20-2 (West 1983); IND. CODE ANN. 34-40-20-3 Cum.
Annual Pocket Part (,Vest 1987-88). Iowa has a fifteen-year statute. IOWA CODE § 614.1(11)
(West Supp. 1989); Kansas has a two-year limitation on actions in tort and a ten-year limitation
on latent defect actions. KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-513 (K.S.A. Supp. 1988). Kentucky
has a five-year statute that bars wrongful death actions. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.135 (Baldwin
1986). Louisiana has a ten-year statute that bars actions for wrongful death. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9-2771 (,Vest 1965). However, at this time, a movement exists which is attempting to
lower this period. Telephone interview with Ms. Cheryl Terio, Director, Government Affairs,
The American Institute of Architects, (April 8, 1988). Maine has a ten-year statute that does not
mention wrongful death. ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 752-B (1964). Maryland has a ten-year
statute that bars actions for wrongful death. MD. ANN. CODE § 5-108 (1984). Massachusetts has
a six-year statute which does not mention wrongful death actions. MAss. GN. LAws ANN. § 15-
1-41 (1972). Missouri has a ten-year statite that bars wrongful death actions. Mo. ANN. STAT.
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similarly drafted, California's statutes differ from the others in two
significant areas. First, the majority of foreign statutes do not
distinguish latent from patent defects.142 California does distinguish
latent and patent defects and the period of repose varies for each.
Second, approximately half of the statutes specifically include wrong-
ful death actions in their limitations period.143 California bars wrong-
ful death actions only in suits brought on patent defects. Not
surprisingly, these two areas in which California's statutes differ are
also areas in which California courts have had continuing interpretive
difficulties.
A. The Distinction Between Latent Versus Patent Defects in
Statutes of Repose
Since the majority of the construction statutes of repose in the
United States do not distinguish latent from patent defects, 1" the
length of the statutory period is the same whether or not the defect
sued upon was apparent at the time the improvement was substan-
§ 2-208 (Vernon 1987). Nebraska has a ten-year statute (four years if the cause of action could
reasonably be discovered within that period). NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-223 (1985). Nevada has two
separate statutes, a six-year statute for patent defects, including a bar of wrongful death actions
and an eight-year statute for latent defects including a bar of wrongful death actions. NEv. REv.
STAT. §§ 11.204, 11.205 (1985). New Jersey has a ten-year statute including a bar of wrongful
death actions. N.J. STAT. ANx. § 37-1-27 (West 1987). North Carolina has a six-year statute that
does not mention wrongful death. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50 (1983). North Dakota has a ten-year
statute that includes a bar of wrongful death actions. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-45 (1974). Ohio
has a ten-year statute that includes wrongful death actions. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.131
(Anderson 1981). Oregon has a ten-year statute that does not mention wrongful death actions.
OR. Ray. STAT. § 12.135 (1985). Pennsylvania has a twelve-year statute that includes a bar of
wrongful death actions. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5536 (Purdon 1981). Rhode Island has a
ten-year statute that includes wrongful death actions. R.I. GEM. LAWS § 9-1-29 (1985). South
Carolina has a thirteen-year statute including wrongful death actions. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15- 3-
640 (Law. Co-op 1976). South Dakota has a ten-year statute that includes wrongful death actions.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS A.NNi. § 15-2-9 (1984). Tennessee has a four-year statute that includes
wrongful death actions. TEN. CODE Ai. § 28-3-202 (1980). Texas has a ten-year statute that
includes wrongful death actions. TFax. Crv. PRAC. & REmi. CODE ANN. § 16.008 (Vernon 1988).
Utah has a seven-year statute including wrongful death actions. UitA CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5
(1987). Virginia has a five-year statute including wrongful death actions. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
250 (1987). Washington has a six-year statute. WASH. Ray. CODE § 4.16.310 (1962) (amended in
1987). West Virginia has a ten-year statute including wrongful death actions. W. VA. CODE §
55-2-6a (1981). Wisconsin has a ten-year statute including wrongful death actions. Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 893.89 (West 1983). Wyoming has a ten-year statute including wrongful death actions.
Wyo. STAT. § 1-2-111 (1977).
142. See infra notes 144-55 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 156-160 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 141.
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tially completed. 145 Other than California, only Florida, Nebraska,
Kansas, and Nevada differentiate between latent and patent defects, 46
and only Nevada has separate statutes for each. 47
The principal difference in the treatment of the two types of
defects is that the period of repose varies according to the clasification
of the defect. 4 Facially, this distinction seems simple enough, but
the problems inherent in applying dual statutes are enormous.
In order to apply the proper statute the court must first determine
whether the defect is latent or patent. Since this determination may
create a factual question, a trial may be necessary simply to determine
which statute applies. Additionally, California has failed to ade-
quately define what constitutes a patent defect and whether it must
exist upon substantial completion or may arise after completion. 49
The questions of fact arise from the different methods of discov-
ering a latent versus a patent defect.Y0 A latent defect is usually
145. These are four to fifteen-year limitation periods in the U.S. construction defect statutes.
Generally these limit actions for damages, contribution, indemnity, tort, contract, or a combination
of these. For example, the actions are usually brought based on, "any deficiency in the survey
or plat, planning, design, specifications, supervision, or observation of construction, or construc-
tion of an improvement to real property." GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-51 (1982).
146. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (1980); NEB. R v. STAT. § 23-223 (1985); NEv. REv. STAT. §§
11.204-11.205 (1985).
147. Nay. REv. STAT. §§ 11.204-11.205 (1985). Nevada has a six-year statute of limitations
period for patent defects and an eight-year period for latent defects. Other than the time
limitations on patent versus latent defects the statutes are identical.
148. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (1980) (four years for defects, 15 years for latent defects);
NEB. Rav. STAT. § 23-223 (1985) (four years from act or omission if reasonably discoverable or
two years from discovery if not capable of reasonably being discovered but in no event after ten
years have passed from the act giving rise to the cause of action); NEv. REV. STAT. § 11.204-
11.205 (1985) (six years for patent defects, eight years for latent defects).
149. See, e.g., Kralow v. Sulley-Miller Contracting Co., 168 Cal. App. 3d 1029, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 630 (1985) (declining to follow Nicholson-Brown, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 62 Cal. App.
3d 526, 133 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1976); plaintiff may recover for claims arising from patently deficient
construction work regardless of whether the claims existed upon substantial completion. Court
believed that intent was to provide a cause of action for patent deficiencies existing upon
substantial completion); Baker v. Walker & Walker, Inc., 133 Cal. App. 3d 746, 184 Cal. Rptr.
245 (1982) (defect in air conditioning and heating system considered latent based solely on nature
of defect with no mention of time of occurrence); Anderson v. Browwer, 49 Cal. App. 3d 176,
160 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1979) (defects appearing within four months of completion considered latent);
Wagner v. State of California, 86 Cal. App. 3d 922, 150 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1978) (allegation that
defendant was "negligent in regards to the designing, planning and construction of a road and
intersection" deemed to fall under patent defect statute); Eden v. Van Tine, 83 Cal. App. 3d
879, 148 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1978) (defects occurring every three years after substantial completion
labeled patent by trial court, reversed and called latent by court of appeal); Nicholson-Brown,
Inc. v. City of San Jose, 62 Cal. App. 3d 526, 133 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1976) (patent defect statute
section 337.1 held to have been applicable to defects arising before substantial completion).
150. Compare Grimmer v. Harbor Towers, 133 Cal. App. 3d 88, 183 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1982)
(a railing was considered latent) with Mattingly v. Anthony Industries, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 3d
506, 167 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1980) (absence of a fence around a pool deemed patent). See also
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
discovered because damages lead to an investigation disclosing the
actual defect. In essence, the latent statutes of repose operate as
"discovery" type statutes of limitations within the boundaries of the
repose period. 15 1
The patent defect, however, is now defined as a defect that is
"apparent by reasonable inspection" at the time of substantial com-
pletion of the improvement. 52 Thus, patent defect statutes of repose
actually operate as "event" type statutes. The burden is on the
plaintiff to discover the defect upon substantial completion, whether
or not any damages have resulted.'53 "Reasonable inspection" is a
question of fact.
Since the defect is now required to be patent upon substantial
completion, then as Mr. Acret pointed out during the committee
hearing for section 337.15
[s]uch a statute that applies only to patent defects you really don't
need because it would already come under the other provisions of
the statute of limitations. If it is a patent defect, the owner should
have known about it anyway so the statute should have started to
run at the time that the defect occurred or at the time the act
occurred. '14
Construction statutes of repose that do not distinguish between latent
and patent defects avoid the redundancy and questions of fact that
arise from the distinction.
The fact that construction defect statutes in all other jurisdictions
except Nevada and California are singular begs the question as to
why California has dual statutes. Unfortunately, the legislative history
leaves no definitive answer. -5 Section 337.1 was enacted in response
to the increasing liability that resulted from the advent of discovery
Renown, Inc. v. Hensel Phelps Const. Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 413, 420, 201 Cal. Rptr. 242, 245
(1984) (the "critical distinction" between latent and patent was the susceptibility to detection and
"what is reasonable" regarding inspection for a defect "is a matter to be determined from the
totality of circumstances of the particular case").
151. See Romo v. Estate of Bennett, 97 Cal. App. 3d 304, 308, 158 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638
(1979) (citing Wagner v. California, 86 Cal. App. 3d 922, 150 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1978) for the
proposition that no accrual was involved since Wagner was a cross-complaint for indemnity
based on patent defects).
152. Preston v. Goldman, 42 Cal. 3d 108, 123, 720 P.2d 476, 485-86, 227 Cal. Rptr. 817,
826-27 (1986) (using objective test, unfenced backyard deemed patent).
153. See supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text regarding event accrual of statute of
limitations.
154. See Committee Transcript, supra note 59, at 13-14. Mr. Acret refers to the fact that a
patent defect is reasonably discoverable and once discovered, the two, three, or four-year
applicable statute begins to run confining the plaintiff to those time frames, regardless of section
337.1. Id.
155. See supra notes 33-58 and accompanying text.
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for accrual of statutes. Section 337.15 was enacted in response to
expanded liability in the form of strict liability and the realization
that 337.1 did not provide adequate protection. California's dual
statutes appear to have been a form of "historical accident" by
which, over a period of years, two statutes were enacted rather than
one comprehensive statute.
B. Other Jurisdictions Include Wrongful Death Actions in the
Statutory Bar
Many foreign construction statutes of repose specifically include
wrongful death actions as being time barred by the statute. 156 In
California, wrongful death actions are expressly included in the patent
defect statute. However, the latent defect statute is silent on the issue
of whether a wrongful death action is time barred. 5 7 California case
law has held that wrongful death actions based on latent defects are
not time barred by section 337.15.158
Jurisdictions that exclude or fall to mention wrongful death in
their statutes of repose defy the legislative intent behind statutes of
repose; ie. to limit long-term liability. 59 This exclusion of wrongful
death actions may have been an attempt to mitigate a perceived
harshness of an absolute statutory bar. However, if the case involves
a non-owner plaintiff, although the plaintiff's action against the
builder or contractor might be time barred, the plaintiff still has
recourse against the owner or possessor of the property under the
well-established principles that define a land occupier's duties. If the
plaintiff is an owner-plaintiff, then it must be remembered that the
use, care, and maintenance of structures by those in direct control
have increasing effects on the integrity of an improvement as the
years pass. This is exactly why those in the construction industry
who constructed an improvement should not be subject to liability
after a number of years.
With the historical perspective and noted weakness of sections
337.1 and 337.15, a brief look at the drafting differences in Califor-
156. See supra note 141.
157. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text for complete text of sections 337.1 and
337.15.
158. Martinez v. Traubner, 32 Cal. 3d 755, 760, 653 P.2d 1046, 187 Cal. Rptr. 251, 253,
(1982).
159. See Committee Transcripts, supra note 42, at 2-8.
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nia's statutes identifies areas that are ripe for revision at a time when
no external pressures might function to cause another historical
accident.
IV. CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTIONs 337.1 AND
337.15-DRAFTING DIFFERENCES
California's construction defect statutes of repose contain five
obvious drafting differences. The most obvious difference is that
section 337.1 imposes a repose period of four years on patent defects,
whereas section 337.15 imposes a repose period of ten years on latent
defects. 16 Section 337.1 preceded section 337.15 by four years and
was based on the A.I.A. statute, which did not distinguish between
patent and latent defects.' 61
The second major difference is that while section 337.1 expressly
includes actions for personal injury and wrongful death, section
337.15 makes no reference to personal injury or wrongful death
actions. 62 This inadvertance seems to contradict the legislative intent
behind all statutes of repose to limit long-term liability of those
involved in the construction industry. Personal injury and wrongful
death actions are lawsuits which are likely to be brought long after
an improvement is complete and long after those in the construction
industry have handed the improvement over to others. These lawsuits
are no less difficult to defend than any other lawsuit when it comes
to stale evidence, lost records, and lost witnesses. In addition, these
lawsuits are likely to be costly, thus subjecting the contractor or
architect to large scale liability.
The third difference is that while section 337.1 is silent on the
issue of whether suits against sureties are time barred, section 337.15
includes the protection of the statutory bar for sureties. 63
The fourth drafting difference is that section 337.1 does not make
any exception for actions based on willful misconduct or fraudulent
concealment. Section 337.15, however, expressly excludes actions
based on willful misconduct or fraudulent concealment.'1"
160. See supra notes 4-5 for full text of sections 337.1 and 337.15.
161. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 4 and 5.
163. See supra notes 4 and 5.
164. See supra notes 4 and 5.
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Finally, section 337.1 does not define substantial completion. Sec-
tion 337.15, however, sets specific guidelines for what constitutes
substantial completion and defines substantial completion as comple-
tion "of the development or improvement. ' 165 This definition allows
courts to hold that each party to the construction is deemed to have
the date of substantial completion of his work apply with regard to
the liability period for long-term projects 66 and furthers the legislative
intent to limit long-term liability. Since section 337.1 does not define
substantial completion of a development or improvement, the poten-
tial for misapplication exists unless reference to section 337.15 is
made.
These individual drafting differences in California's "separate but
related" sections 337.1 and 337.15 prove that the growing process
for these two statutes remains incomplete. The addition of the ten-
year statute of repose for latent defects four years after the enactment
of the four-year statute of repose for patent defects has left California
with two statutes that fall to be as effective as one statute could be.
Consequently, California's construction defect statutes are a source
of confusion in California construction lawsuits. In re-evaluating the
use, the intent, and the drafting of the dual construction defect
statutes, the time has come to blend these statutes into one compre-
hensive statute.
VI. PROPOSAL
This article proposes a model statute that incorporates a combi-
nation of elements from sections 337.1 and 337.15. The model statute
provides a limitation period of eight years that is defined as a period
of repose. This time limit balances the competing interests of assuring
repose to those in the construction industry with the law of dimishing
returns based on the percentage of claims filed within years after
completion statistics. 167
165. See supra notes 4 and 5.
166. See Liptak v. Diane Apts., Inc., 109 Cal. App. 3d 762, 167 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1980).
167. Amend Statute of Limitations, 1967: Hearing before subcommittee no. I of the Com-
mittee on the District of Columbia of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 28
(1967) (study of distribution of claims by length of time). This study was made in 1964, using
random sample of 570 professional liability claims then pending against architects and engineers
and attached to the record as an exhibit. The cumulative percentage of claims in year eight was
found to be 98.7% whereby adding two years the cumulative percentage of claims rose only to
99.6%. Comment, Limitation of Actions: The Effect of Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp. on
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A MODEL STATUTE FOR CALIFORNIA-UNIFICATION OF C.C.P.
SECTIONS 337.1 AND 337.15
EIGHT YEARS REPOSE; DEVELOPER, CONTRACTOR, ARCHITECT, ETC. OF
REAL PROPERTY; ANY DEFICIENCY IN DESIGN, SUPERVISION, ETC.;
INIURY TO PROPERTY
(a) No action may be brought to recover damages from any
person, or the surety of a person, who develops real property or
performs or furnishes the design, specifications, surveying, planning,
supervision, testing, observation of construction, or construction of
an improvement to real property more than eight years after the
substantial completion of the development or improvement for any
of the following:
(1) Any deficiency in the design, specification, surveying,
planning, supervision, observation of construction, or con-
struction of an improvement to, or survey of, real property.
(2) Injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any
such deficiency.
(3) Injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of
any such deficiency.
(b) If, by reason of such deficiency, an injury to property or the
person or an injury causing wrongful death occurs during the seventh
year after such substantial completion, an action in tort to recover
damages for such an injury or wrongful death may be brought
within one year after the date on which such injury occurred
irrespective of the date of death; but in no event may such an
action be brought more than nine years after the substantial com-
pletion of construction of such improvement.
(c) As used in this section, "action" includes an action for
indemnity brought against a person arising out of that person's
performance or furnishing of services or materials referred to in
this section. Except that a cross-complaint for indemnity may be
filed pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 428.10 in an action
which has been brought within the time period set forth in subdi-
vision (a) of this section.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the
period prescribed by other laws of this state for bringing any action.
(e) The limitation prescribed by this section shall not be asserted
Future Cases Determining the Constitutionality of G.S. 1-50(6), 19 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 1049
(1983). See also, Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders - Blueprints
for Nonaction, 18 CATH. U. L. REv. 361 (1969).
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by way of defense by any person in actual possession or the control,
as owner, tenant or otherwise, of such an improvement, at the time
any deficiency in the improvement constitutes the proximate cause
for which it is proposed to bring an action.
(f) This section shall not apply to actions based on willful
misconduct or fraudulent concealment.
(g) The eight year period specified in subdivision (a) shall com-
mence upon substantial completion of the specific improvement.
This date will be no later than the date of one of the following,
whichever occurs first:
(1) The final date of inspection of the improvement by the
applicable public agency.
(2) The date of recordation of a valid notice of completion.
(3) The date of use or occupation of the improvement.
(4) One year after termination or cessation of work on the
improvement.
The date of substantial completion shall relate specifically to the
performance or furnishing design, specifications, surveying, planning,
supervision, testing, observation of construction or construction serv-
ices by each profession or trade rendering services to the improve-
ment.
VII. CONCLUSION
This model statute is proposed in response to the difficulties created
by the existing statutes, and in the spirit of California's perpetual
striving for progressive legislation and judicial application. Addition-
ally, this model statute is proposed in response to the specific
difficulties mentioned in this article that arise from the separate-but-
related nature of sections 337.1 and 337.15. The combination of
these statutes into one comprehensive statute that resolves their
drafting differences should assure that the model statute is properly
interpreted and applied.
First, the proposed statute will eliminate the need to distinguish
whether the subject defects are latent versus patent. Once discovered
any defect will then be subject to the regular applicable statutes of
limitations. One statute for both types of defects will eliminate the
need to decide a question of fact-whether the defect was latent or
patent-before the proper statute can be applied.
Second, although the model statute will bar actions for wrongful
death and personal injury, the plaintiff will retain the right to sue
those in possession and control of the property. The model statute
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gives a one-year grace period to personal injury or wrongful death
actions that accrue in the last year before the statute runs. These
two factors should provide a reasonable period of repose for those
in the construction industry, yet still assure an adequate time period
over which to discover and file a construction lawsuit.
Third, the model statute protects the plaintiff by excluding all
actions based on willful misconduct or fraudulent concealment. This
protection previously existed only in section 337.15.
Fourth, the model statute limits the time for bringing a construc-
tion-related lawsuit. The time period of eight years is chosen partic-
ularly for its statistical relationship to the number of claims filed
within eight years after substantial completion 6 ' and the interest in
limiting long term liability in the construction industry. Eight years
is proposed as the balancing point between the competing rights and
liabilities here.
Finally, the model leaves no doubt regarding its nature. It states
in its preface that it is a statute of repose.
When future California practitioners consider a construction defect
lawsuit "priority one" is determining whether a lawsuit was filed
within the applicable statute of limitations. If enacted this model
statute will assure that when California practitioners are faced with
applying a limitation statute to the facts of their case, they will not
also be faced with a mass of confusion. This model statute will
assure that every practitioner recognizes the statute's character as a
statute of repose. Furthermore, the practitioner will not have to guess
whether or not subject defects are latent or patent. Finally, the new
eight-year time limit serves as a compromise between plaintiffs and
defendant's interests and the old four-year and ten-year statutes.
Adoption of the model statute proposed here should simplify and
streamline a currently cumbersome and confusing area of the law.
168. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
